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THE "RUN-OFF" ELECTION UNDER THE WAGNER
ACT - A REVIEW AND A PROPOSAL
BERTRAM

F.

WILLCOX AND STANLEY M.

LEvY

Free political elections have long been a part of the fibre of American
life. During the past decade free industrial elections have attained comparable importance. They relate to a different aspect of the voter's life,
his life as a worker, but they may often affect him more deeply than
political elections do. It is the object of this paper to show a way in which
the machinery of industrial elections can be improved.
The political election is final, but the industrial election is only advisory.
The results of the industrial election are evidence which a government agency
may use to make decisions. In matters affecting interstate commerce, for example, the National Labor Relations Board has the task of deciding disputes over
what union, if any, shall represent the workers of a particular bargaining unit,
and of certifying its decision to the parties. This the Board does when
the parties have agreed (or the Board has decided) upon the appropriate
bargaining unit but the parties cannot agree on a union for that unit. As an
aid to the Board in deciding this issue, the Wagner Act permits the use
of an election. It does not require, one, and the Board is free to use other
methods for investigating and deciding, if it prefers to do so.
The Act puts the task in the most general terms, leaving all details to be
worked out in the experimental processes of administration. Specifically, the
Act says that the representative designated or selected for collective bargaining by the majority of employees in any appropriate unit shall be the
exclusive representative for all the employees in that unit, and that when
the Board investigates this question it shall hold a hearing and may take
a secret ballot of employees or utilize any other suitable method.,
Here is much room for experimentation, and much experimentation there
has been. At first the Board used comparisons of payroll records with union
cards, called "cross-checks", and certified many unions without election.
But experience has gradually shown the election to be the best method, and
149 STAT. 449 et seq., 453 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq., 159 (1940) referred to
in the text as the "National Labor Relations Act," the "Wagner Act" or simply the
"Act". §§ 9(a) and 9(c), referred to inthe text, read as follows:
9(a) "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
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in increasing numbers elections have been ordered. On November 27, 1945,
the holding of elections was even made routine procedure, no longer requiring preliminary hearing and a special order of the Board for each case.*
The magnitude of this new phenomenon, the industrial elections, is reflected
by the following recent statement of the Board: "During the 11-year period,
the Board conducted approximately 30,000 elections and cross checks, in
which about 8,140,000 employees were eligible to express their collective
bargaining desires. The importance of self-determination to the American
worker is demonstrated by the consistently high percentage of eligible employees who have exercised the franchise. Throughout this period, 6,813,537,
83%6 of those eligible to vote,3 went to the polls to express themselves for or
against a bargaining representative." 4 Bearing in mind that these random
figures relate to interstate commerce only, and that many State Boards conduct similar elections, it is clear that the problems of the industrial election
are matters of considerable public importance.
One of the knottiest of these problems, and one of the most crucial, is that
of the "run-off" election. If the initial ballot contains spaces in which to
vote for one of two unions or more and contains also a space in which the
worker may vote against having any union at all, it may happen that none
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-

ment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee

or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer."

9(c) "Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the repre-

sentation of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify
to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been
designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under
section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any
other
suitable method to ascertain such representatives."
2
This change was made by amendments to Article III of the Rules and Regulatiois
of the National Labor Relations Board, which authorized the Board's Regional Direc-

tors, "in cases which present no substantial issues," (other than designation by a
majority) to conduct an election. See Tenth Annual Report of the National Labor
Relations Board, p. 15, footnote 3. Hearing is a matter of right but the hearing
may be held later. The Board's field examiners and attorneys may also conduct such
pre-hearing elections. See, for the Board's present practice in these respects, National
Labor Relations Board, Statement of Procedure, §§ 201.18, 202.19 (11 F. R. of Sept. 11.
1946,
pp. 177A-622).
3
This 83% of eligible voters who vote, incidentally, would be high by comparison
with political elections. It is typical of industrial elections, partly because pains
are-taken to make it convenient for all to vote, and partly, no doubt, because workers

are4 vitally interested in a matter which affects them so closely.
Eleventh Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1946.
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of these choices will receive a majority of all the ballots cast. In such a case
the Board usually orders a run-off election. What choices ought to appear
upon the second, or run-off, ballot?
Should it present a choice between the highest union and no union at all?
The Board so decided in the Coos Bay case,5 in October, 1939. Should it
present a choice between the two highest unions? The same Board so
decided five months later in the LeBlond case. 6 If more workers vote for
"no-union" than for either of the two unions, should any run-off at all be
held? At the end of another three months the same Board said "no" and
dismissed the petitions for investigation in the General Motors case; 7 no
two of the three Board members could agree. Should all except the two
highest choices be eliminated in every case? This would follow the logic
and the analogy of the political run-off election.8
Where "no-union" has a plurality, as in the General Motors case, should
a run-off be held between the higher union and "no-union"? Where "nounion" comes in second, or worse than second, should a run-off be held between the two highest unions only? These two solutions, with some
exceptions and qualifications, represent the policy of the Board as expressed
in a Regulation which it adopted, after public hearings, in the summer of
1943. 9 One of the most important of the qualifications is that no union shall
5In the Matter of Coos Bay Lumber Co., 16 N. L. R. B. 476 (199), Mr. William
M. Leiserson dissenting. The result reached was the same which the Board had
arrived at a year before, without giving much thought to the matter, in In the Matter of
Aluminum Line, 9 N. L. R. B. 72, 79 and 91 (1938).
The Board had temporarily departed from this solution of the run-off problem in In the Matter of Aluminum Co. of
America, 12 N. L. R. B. 237 (1939) in which it had adopted the policy of ordering successive run-offs until a majority for some union or for "no-union" should result
in one. In each such run-off that union was to be dropped which had received
the smallest number of votes in th6 preceding, election. The Board remarked that the
issue had not been squarely presented in In the Matter of Aluminum Line, 9 N. L. R. B.
72.
6In the Matter of R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool C%., 22 N. L. R. B. 465 (1940),
partial dissents by Chairman Madden and Mr. Leiserson.
7In the Matter of General Motors Corp., 25 N. L. R. B. 258 (1940).
Each of the
three Board members took a different view.' The results of this trio of decisions are
easier to understand if it is noted that the Board takes two votes in each case: the first,
on the question whether a run-off election shall be ordered; and the second, if the
motion for a run-off has carried, on the question whether a proposed ballot-form shall
be adopted.
SThe Board temporarily adopted this view, as among unions in In the Matter of
Aluminum Co. of America, 12 N. L. R. B. 237 (1939). See also note 5 supra.
9See, for the present provisions, National Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regulations, Series 4, issued August 28, 1946. The change had become effective on August
23, 1943. The full text, which has not been changed in very material respects since its
adoption, now reads as follows:
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find a place upon the run-off ballot unless that union polled at least 20%
of the votes cast in the original election. Since the average for each of three
choices would be 33/3%, this limitation upon the other rules must operate
(a) The agent designated pursuant to the provisions of SeCtion 203.55 to conduct
the election, shall conduct a run-off election, without further order of the Board,
when the results in the election are inconclusive because no choice on the ballot in
the election received a majority of the valid ballots cast and when no objections
are filed as provided in Section 203.55: provided, that a written request by any
representative entitled to appear on the run-off ballot pursuant to this Section is
submitted to.hitm within ten (10) days after the date of the election. Only one
run-off election shall be held pursuant to this Section.
(b) Employees who were eligible to vote in the election and who are employed in
an eligible category on the date of the run-off election shall be eligible to vote in
a run-off election.
(c) The ballot in the run-off election shall provide for a selection between the two
choices that receive the largest and the second largest number of valid votes cast
in the election, except as provided in this paragraph or otherwise directed by the
Board.
(1) In the event the number of votes cast for "neither" in an inconclusive
election in which the ballot provided for a choice among two representatives
and "neither" is less than the number cast for one representative, but more
than or equal to the number cast for the other representative, or if the votes are
equally divided among the three choices, the run-off ballot shall provide for
a choice between the two representatives.
(2) In the event the number of votes cast for "neither" in an inconclusive
election in which the ballot provided for a choice among two representatives
and "neither" is more than the number cast for either of the two representatives but the votes cast for the two representatives are tied and the combined
number of votes cast for the two representatives is equal to or exceeds 50% of
the total valid votes cast, the run-off ballot shall provide for a selection between the three choices afforded in the original ballot.
(3) In the event the number of votes cast for "none" in an inconclusive
election, in which the ballot provided for a choice among three or more representatives and "none", is equal to the number cast for the representative with
the largest number of votes, or is less than the number cast for the representative with the largest number of votes but more than or the same as the
number cast for the representative with the second largest number of votes as
among representatives, or is the same as the number cast for each of the two
highest representatives, the run-off ballot shall provide for a choice between the
two representatives.
(4) In the event the number of votes cast for "none" in an inconclusive
election, in which the ballot provided for a choice among three or more representatives and "none", is less than the number cast for the representative with
the largest number of votes and more than the number cast for any other
representative but an equal number of votes is cast for each of two or more
such other representatives, the run-off ballot shall provide for a choice among
the three or more representatives, provided, however, that in the event such
run-off election is inconclusive no further run-off shall be conducted.
(5) No representative shall be accorded a place on the run-off ballot unless
that representative received at least twenty per cent of the valid votes cast in
the election. 29 C. F. R. § 203.56 through Subdiv. (c), 11 F. R. of Sept. 11,
1946, pp. 177A-612. 613. See also in "Statement of Procedure" 29 C. F. R.
§ 202.20, 11 F. R. 177A-623.
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to eliminate a considerable number of thirdchoice unions. The other important qualification is that no more than one run-off will ever be held. In
this the Board Rule departs from previous Board policy as expressed in
1939.10

It is a purpose of this paper to suggest that none of these solutions is
sofind; .that run-off elections in labor cases should be eliminated; that in
those elections which involve two unions a simple form of two-choice ballot would better effectuate the policies of the Act.'" We believe, furtherlore, that this solution would be legal, and that it would be simple and
workable in practice. It would save the money of the taxpayer as well as
the time and energy of a hard-pressed agency staff.
The run-off election presents two separable problems which have usually
been considered as one. One of these is the problem of contriving that a
majority of all votes be cast for one particular choice, which majority may
then be pointed to in supposed compliance with the Act.' 2 This we may
call, for convenience, the "majority problem." It is a bogus problem, because
the Act does not require that a majority of all the votes be cast for a single
candidate or choice. All that the Act requires is a designation or selection
by a majority of the workers in a unit. Whether there has been such a
designation or selection is the ultimate issue. What evidence the Board
may use in deciding this issue is left to its discretion. The Act does not insist upon an election. If the Board holds one, there is no statutory requirement that a majority must vote for one union. A majority do not even need
to vote at all. For all the statute says, the Board might use a sampling
method like that of the public-opinion polls; and if the numbers involved
were large enough, even this might not be an unreasonable exercise of
discretion. But we need not go so far as that. If the Board holds an election
where all workers may vote, such an election may certainly be used as evidence, and the Board may draw any reasonable inference from it concerning
the preference of the entire unit.
The other problem is that of interpreting a vote for one union. We may
dub this, for convenience, the "interpretation problem." It is a real problem
and an important one. In considering it one should bear in mind that a
union, once certified, has sweeping statutory powers to represent, not its
members only, but each and every worker in the unit, to arrange their
10See note 8 .vpra.

"lWagner
Act; Preamble and § 1, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
' 2Wagner Act, § 9(a) ; 49 STAT. 453 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. § 159(a) (1940).
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working lives and to make their contracts for them. Now, the question is:
When a worker votes for a union, does he vote for collective bargaining
by that union, or against collective bargaining by any other? The data are
incapable of answering the question. And the question needs to be answered
if, as we believe, it is the policy of the Act not to force any union upon any
worker without giving that worker a chance to vote against that union.
Board members and judges have guessed, industriously and vehemently, at
the answer to this question.' 3 And the Board's present rule is, in truth, no
more than a codification based on a compromise of these conflicting guessworks.
If the Board orders an election, it is not necessary, as we have noted,
that a majority of the eligible voters in the unit shall cast ballots for one union.
This'was decided early and has been held consistently. If a majority of the
eligible- voters go to the polls and vote, a majority of those voting will lay
a legal basis for a certification. Even if only a minority of the eligibles
vote, the same result is reached if that minority are a substantial and representative fraction of those entitled.
The analogy of the political election has been relied upon here, although
it has also been objected, correctly, that the analogy is inaccurate.1 4 In a
political election someone must be elected. It makes no difference if only
a third or a fourth of the eligible voters take the trouble to vote. Thosewho do not are presumed to agree to the choices of those who do, and they
are accordingly bound by the result. In an industrial election no one needs
to be elected. If a majority of the workers in a unit do not select or designate a statutory representative, things go on as before. The "full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their
own choosing" to be protected by the Act 15 cannot be thought to compel
representation. The "freedom" is to do freely, or with equal freedom not
to do. If this were not the policy of the Act, it would be incongruous to find
that an employer who encourages union membership among his men is
guilty of'an unfair labor practice, although the' union is independent and
has no rival in the field. Yet such is quite clearly the law. 16
'3 For example see the instances referred to in notes 32 and 39 infra.
14See, for example, Chairman Madden's remarks in the LeBlond Case, 22 N. L. R. B.
465,5 at 470, note 6 supra.
1 6Wagner Act, § 1; 49 STAT. 449 (1935); 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1940).
1 Wagner Act, § 8(3) ; 49 STAT. 452 (1935) ; 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
In the Matter of American Car and Foundry Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1031 (1946) ; In the
Matter of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 66 N. L. R. B. 1083 (1946) and cases relied
upon, including National Labor Relations Board v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co.,
Inc., 315 U. S. 685, 62 Sup. Ct. 846 (1942).

We assume of course that the union aided

has no valid contract with the employer within the "closed-shop proviso" of § 8(3).
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A sounder support for the Board's practice of certifying upon a majority.
of those who vote is recognition of the fact that, as we have seen, the election
is evidence only, which the Board may use in reaching its finding on the ultimate question of fact.
Obviously the Board ought never to employ arbitrarily its power to rely
on an election in which only a small fraction of the voters have participated.
If it did, its action would undoubtedly incur the disapproval of the courts.
The results of the election, in other words, must give some real evidence
of a selection by a majority before the Board may properly ground a certification on them.
Thus there is no problem when choice lies simply between one union and
no union. But what becomes of the statutory requirement of selection or
designation by a majority when two or more unions compete for the votes?
This is the question which the Board has tried to answer by the run-off election, with only two choices on the second ballot. One choice now must
receive a majority. But on the vital point, what two choices the run-off
ballot should offer, the Board has veered about. Its lively record on this
question projects an interesting picture of experimentation with a knotty
problem, of adoption of various solutions in turn, and finally, of achievement
of a workable balance. But the present compromise is still inadequate. It
contains unnecessary possibilities for the working of injustice.
Let us glance at the history of this difficulty. Under § 7-a of the National
Industrial Recovery Act 7 the problem did not yet exist, because certification under that section was not made except upon a vote by a majority of
all eligibles. If there was only one union the ballot contained two choices:
for it, or against it. If there were two or more unions the ballot contained
the names of those unions and nothing more. Nothing more was needed.
A worker who did not want any union, voted that choice, easily and effectively, by simply staying away from the polls.
STAT. 195, 198-9 (1933), § 7-a:
"Every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or
issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) That employees
shall 'have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, 'in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no
employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or
assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall
comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employment, approved or prescribed by the President."

1748
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The National Labor Relations Board continued at first to use the same
ballot-form and procedure under the Wagner Act without giving any particular thought to the matter.' 8 In July, 1936, however, the Board decided
in the Associated Press case' 9 when a majority of those eligible went to the
polls, that it ought to certify upon the ballots of a mere majority of those
voting. Abstention abruptly changed its character. From being a vote for
"no-union", it suddenly became a vote for whatever choice was finally to
prevail in the election.
In November, 1936, in the R. C. A. Mfg. Co. case, m this new policy was
first applied to an election between two competing unions. There was still
no place on the ballot whereby a voter could vote against any union. In
spite of this fact, and in spite of the fact that one of the competing unions
boycotted the election, certification was accorded to the other (which had
received most of the ballots cast by the three thousand workers who went
to the polls). But nearly ten thousand were eligible. The cry of the union
which boycotted the election was that abstention was a vote against the other
union. The opinion contented itself with discussing three possible meanings of
the requirements of the Act: first, that a majority of those eligible vote for
a union to be certified; second, that a majority of those eligible vote, and a
majority of that majority vote for such aunion; or third, that a majority of
those voting vote for such a union. When the Board showed conclusively that
the third possibility was sufficient in the opinion of the courts, they seemed
21
to feel that the problems of the R. C. A. case were disposed of.
A year later, in August, 1937, the Board was confronted in In the Matter
of American France Line 22 with a case where two bitterly rival unions were
in the field; and the Board suddenly realized that it would not be reasonable to infer from the election returns that the abstainers were expressing the
same choice as the voters. Abstainers might object to both unions, but they
could not vote against both. There was no such choice upon the ballot.
Accordingly, the Board on its own motion initiated a policy of inserting a
18See William Gorham Rice, Jr., The Determination of Employee Representatives
(1938)
5 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 188, 219-220.
191n the Matter of the Associated Press, 1 N. L. R. B. 686, 697 (1936).
20
1n the Matter of R. C. A. Mfg. Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 159, 173 (1936).
211d.
at 173 et seq.
22

1n the Matter of American France Line, 3 N. L. R. B. 64 (1937), amended decison, at 74-76. Compare with McNulty v. National Mediation Board, 18 F. Supp.

494 (N. D. N. Y. 1936) under the Railway Labor Act, 48 STAT. 1186 (1934);
45 U. S. C. § 152 (1940), whereby a ballot allowing choice of either the one union
which was a candidate, or any other union to be written in, had been disapproved by
the court and a new election had been suggested with a ballot similar but containing a
space to vote against any collective bargaining at all.
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space for a "no-union" choice on each ballot in the original election. This
policy was adhered to, after oral argument against it on behalf of two unions,
in In the Matter of Interlake Iron Corp.2 As Professor William G. Rice
has pointed. out,24 the adoption of this policy ended an anomalous situation
which had existed from July, 1936, to August, 1937. During that period it
had been impossible for one of two competing unions to fail of certification
for the want of a majority vote although one union alone could do so, as
could also one of three unions or more. The adoption of this new policy in
1937 precipitated the questions of the run-off election with which we are
chiefly concerned in this article, because from then on every election inVolving two unions presented the voter with three choices.
Although the policy of ordering run-off elections had been early adopted by
the Board25 and the problem of the run-off had been alluded to in the Interlake Iron Corp. case, 26 the issue was first squarely raised and the technique
was first carefully explained in In the Matter of Coos Bay Lumnber Co., 2
decided on October 26, 1939. This case decided that the' run-off election
must offer a 'choice between the union which had received the largest number
of votes and no union at all. Next year the Board swung to a different
result-a run-off between the two unions-In the Matter of R. K. LeBlond
Machine Tool Co.28 This decision, the Coos Bay case, and the General
Motors case2 9 also in 1940, where no decision could be made, have already
2In
the Matter of Interlake Iron Corp., 4 N. L. R. B. 55 (1937), Commissioner
Edwin S. Smith dissenting. This decision expressly overruled so much of In the
Matter of International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 384 (1936), as had
rejected, at pages 390-391, the company's request that the ballot contain a space in
which to vote for "individual bargaining" and had ordered that the ballot contain the
names of the three contending unions only.
2See note 18 supra; 5 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, at 219-220 and especially

n. 2171, at 220.
5It appears to have been adopted first in In the Matter of Fedders Mfg. Co., 4
N. L. R. B. 770 (1938), though without thorough discussion of the problems involved.
This decision was made by Chairman Madden and Mr. Edwin S. Smith. Mr. Donald
W. Smith took no part. In the absence of dissent on the Board, the reasons for the
decisions were not elaborated here, as they were elaborated later in the Coos Bay case.
There Chairman Madden remarked [16 N. L. R. B. 476 (1939)]: "In accordance with
our ulmal policy we shall direct a run-off election to determine whether or not the
employees in the unit desire to be represented by the United [which had received
195 votes, 7 more than the second union]. In view of the objections raised by the
dissenting opinion to the holding of run-off elections, we shall first set forth in some
detail the considerations, which have seemed to us controlling in the determination of
these
(Italics ours.)
26 issues."
In the Matter of Interlake Iron Corp., note 23 supra. See especially Mr. Edwin
Smith's
dissenting opinion at 63.
27
See note 5 supra.
28See note 6 supra.
29
See note 7 smpra.
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been mentioned, and also the Regulation of 194330 which sought, three years
later, to compromise their results. Inasmuch as this trio of decisions were
made by the same Board members in the three cases, and inasmuch as each
member held consistently to his own views throughout, it will perhaps simplify review of these opinions to treat them as if they had been written in
one case instead of three.
The "Majority Problem!' as Viewed by the Board in 1939 and 1940
CHAIRMAN MADDEN: The Act does not prescribe any particular form of
ballot for an election; nor other details for any method which may be used.
Run-offs are a common feature of elections. The use of this device involves
no fundamental issue of policy. Even though the results of a run-off can
be characterized, correctly, as a "second-choice majority", the Act does
not prohibit the Board from using it or from considering the results it may
give.
MR. SMITH: In full accord with Mr. Madden. The run-off election is
completely authorized by law.
MR. LEIsERsoN: The Act does not authorize run-offs, nor any other kind
of preferential voting. Run-offs take various forms. The most common is
an election between the two highest choices. Whether "simple" majorities,
second choices, or other forms of preferential voting are preferable is a
political question on which the people of the country have strong differences
of opinion. The other two members of the Board, who agree that run-offs
are legal, cannot even themselves agree on what type of run-off the Board
should order. This by itself proves that the problem is one of policy. The
Board has no power to settle such problems of policy. The Act states explicitly that a majority shall determine the issue of representatio'n. If an
election fails to produce a majority, the petition for investigation and certification must be dismissed, in every case as a matter of law. Congress was aware
that the ballot might contain more than two choices and that an election might
fail to produce a majority for any one. If it had been the intention of Congress to permit a run-off, or any other method of ascertaining second choices
(like a multiple-choice ballot-form), Congress would have said so in the

Act.3 1

The "Interpretation Problem?' as Viewed by the Board in 1939 and 1940
CHAIRMAN MADDEN:
3
31OSee

Those voting for a union which did not receive the

note 9 supra.
See note 5 supra, especially 16 N. L. R. B. 476, 480-482 (1939).
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plurality migh't prefer the 'union which did receive it to no collective barThese voters should
gaining at all, or they might prefer "no-union."
have an opportunity to vote on that choice in a run-off between the plurality
union and no union. The negative choice must be preserved in the run-off,
because it is against the policy of the Act to force union representation upon
any group against the will of the majority of that group. If "no" does not
appear on the run-off ballot, the result may frequently be just that, because
it is not a fair inference, with union rivalries as bitter as they are, that a
vote for one union indicates a desire for collective bargaining even through
another union. And in an industrial election it is not necessary, as it is in
a political election, that some representative be chosen. For these reasons,
the run-off should be between Union A and "no-union" even in such an
original election as, for example: Union A, 49 votes; Union B, 45; "nounion", 6.
MR. SMITH: Every vote for any union is a vote for collective bargaining.
Though an original election showed one union a poor third, still the run-off
should be between the two unions. The "no-union" choice should always
be dropped. Even if there were 49 votes for "no-union", 45 votes for
Union A, and 6 votes for Union B, the run-off should be between Unions
A and B. "I am not willing to assume that the rivalry between the membership. of two labor organizations is normally so intense that the adherents of
each would prefer no collective bargaining to collective bargaining through
the other organization."' 3 2 In any case, the policy of the Act is to encourage
collective' bargaining, not to discourage it.
MR. LEISERSON: The effort of a Coos Bay type of run-off to give the
majority of workers an opportunity to unite on one union is illusory. Those
who are opposed to the union in the lead are arbitrarily forced either to vote
for "no-union" or to vote for the union to which they are opposed. The
Board should not encourage workers to desert one union for another.
If a run-off there must be, the LeBlond type is the better, eliminating the
"neither" choice from the ballot. "Those who desire no collective bargaining whatever had their opportunity to express their opinion" to that effect
in the original election; and (referring to the LeBlond case) it was less than
8% of all the voters who voted for 'neither." 33
The unexpressed conclusion from Mr. Leiserson's last remark seems to
be: A vote for any union is a vote for collective bargaining if the vote for
32
See note 6 supra, 22 N. L. R. B. 468-469 (1940). Note how obviously this statement is couched in terms'of emotion rather than in strictly rational terms.

:3Id. at

469-470.
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"no-union" is small. As a matter of logic, the non sequitur is obvious.
As a matter of fact, there is probably some degree of correlation. This
appears if one reflects upon the extreme cases. If 49 voters chose "nounion"; 45, Union A; and 6, Union B; it would be reasonable to suppose
that some of the voters for Union B might prefer "no-union" to Union A,
justifying a Coos-Bay run-off, if any. On the other hand, if 6 voters chose
"no-union"; 49, Union A; and 45, Union B; it would be reasonable to
suppose that not enough of the 45 votes for Union B would swing to "nounion" to raise the 6 to a majority.
Mr. Leiserson asserted, without contradiction, that about half of the Coos
Bay run-offs held by the Board did in fact result in a majority vote for "nounion." 34 From this he concluded that the Board would have done better
to, dismiss the petitions at once, without bothering with the formality of a
run-off. But what of the other half of the cases in which a Coos Bay runoff did show a majority voting for one union? And even in the half of
the cases where "no-union" was the final choice, would not the morale of the
pro-union workers be better after a run-off had proved that no union was
wanted, than it would have been if the petition had been dismissed immediately upon the original election, as Mr. Leiserson thought it must be?
Mr. Leiserson's argument assumed that a free first-choice majority is a
real-an ascertainable-phenomenon.
But choice, as a practical matter,
means a selection between available possibilities. The limits of a choice are
the possibilities presented. The possibilities presented, in this case, .are the
competing unions plus a "no-union" choice. If there is but one union, the
choices are two, that union or none; and Mr. Leiserson evidently felt no
doubt that the choice between these two alternatives was a "first-choice
majority" such as the statute, in his opinion, required. Any worker, however, may have had a personal predilection for some other union which was
not even seeking to be certified. If a real personal first choice, by every
voter, were required, the vote might scatter among a dozen unions. In the
ordinary election, with but one union in the field, many votes may be second
or third choices. Yet no one would claim them to be any the less valid for
that. In practice, effective choice exists only under those certain conditions
which are given. A write-in ballot, even where allowed, rarely has much
actual effect..
Because Congress knew the facts about the practical working of elections,
it can hardly be assumed to have limited the Board to ascertaining first
personal choices and those alone.
3416

N. L. R. B. at 482, see note 5, supra.
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We may now glance at the fate of the problems in the courts. Concerning the "majority problem" it is now much clearer than it was in 1940 that
Messrs. Madden and Smith were right, and Mr. Leiserson was wrong.
The Board may use an election, or not, as it wishes. If it does, it may
adopt policies and promulgate regulations making for accurate recording
of the vote so long as it does so within the framework of the principles of
majority rule.
In reversing a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals that an
election was void because the Board had declined to investigate a challenge
which came too late to comply with the Board's rules, the Supreme Court,
in National Labor Relations Board v. A. J. Tower Co., decided on December 23, 1946, said:
"As we have noted before, Congress has entrusted the Board with a
wide degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and safeguards
necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives
by employees. [Citing cases.] Section 9(c) of the Act authorizes the
Board to 'Take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.' In carrying out this
task, of course, the Board must act so as to give effect to the principle
of majority rule set forth in Section 9(a), a rule that 'is sanctioned by
our governmental practices, by business procedure, and by the whole
philosophy of democratic institutions.' S. Rep. No.- 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 13. It is within this democratic framework that the Board
must adopt policies and promulgate rules and regulations in order
that employees' votes may be recorded accurately, efficiently and
speedily." 5
A second-choice ballot does comport with the principle of majority rule.
In fact, it is-the only method which really does so.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Standard Lime and Stone Co.,a6
Circuit Judge Parker, after an excellent review of the authorities which
permit certifications based on a majority of those voting (even where a
majority of those eligible did not vote), had this to say of the Company's
objection to a run-off election:
"And we are not impressed with the contention that the Board's certification may be ignored because 'neither' was omitted from the choices
35329 U. S. 324, 330, 67 Sup. Ct. 324, 328 (1946). Opinion by Murphy, J., Frankfurter, J.,, concurring in result. Jackson, J., dissenting in opinion. See note 44 infra.
And the same Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, has declared that "Nothing
in § 9(c) requires the Board to utilize the results of an election or forbids it to disregard them and utilize other suitable methods." Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325
U. S. 697, 707, 65 Sup. Ct. 1316, 1321 (1945); (Roberts, J., diss. without opinion).
36149 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 723 (1946).
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submitted in the run-off election. On the first election only 57 of the
votes cast registered that choice, which was less than the votes cast for
either of the unions. It could not be unreasonable to drop in the runoff the choice which had received the lowest number of votes. This is
quite usual procedure in other elections and we can see nothing unfair
in applying it here. A former policy of the Board with respect to
such cases was to drop from the ballot the organization receiving the
smaller number of votes and limit the choice in the run-off between
the organization receiving the larger number and no representative.
Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 12 N. L. R. B. 237, 239;
Matter of Coos Bay Lumber Co. 16 N. L. R. B. 476, 479, 480. The
practice of dropping the choice 'neither' from the run-off ballot was
adopted in 1940. Matter of R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Co. 22 N. L.
R. B. 465; Fifth Annual Report of N. L. R. B. p. 60. It is based
upon the Board's view that where in an original election the combined
vote for two labor organizations constitutes a majority of the votes cast,
the employees have expressed a desire to bargain collectively through
some representative.
It is worthy of note that some time after the elections here were held
the Board conducted a public hearing for the purpose of determining
its future policy in dealing with run-off elections, and solicited the views
of employees and labor organizations. As a result of the hearing some
changes were made in certain of the rules as to run-off elections, but
the rule here applied was not changed. We think that there can be no
question but that the rule applied was -in accord with the Board's settled
and established policy and well within the discretion vested in it under
the law. 'The Board enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representatives by'employees.' Southern S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 316 U.
S. 31, 37, 62 Sup. Ct. 886, 890, .. ." [ard citing other cases] .3 7
Except as these remarks have touched on what kind of run;-off the Board
may hold, there seems, surprisingly, to be only one court decision of that
question.
In Internatioiad Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board,38 Circuit Judge Iicks upheld the objections of this
union to a Coos Bay ,type of run-off which had eliminated it from the ballot.
He said:
"We think the order was illegal and that the proposed election was
unfair in effect. It was in the teeth of the policy formulated in the
statute, that the employees should be protected in the exercise of full
freedom of designation of representatives of their own choosing. The
employee was not given full freedom of choice. If he voted he could
37

rd. at 439. For the text of the 1943 regulations on run-off elections, see note 9 mp ra.

38105 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
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either ratify or reject the nominee of the Board but if he rejected it he
was through. He had no alternative,-he could not choose for himself.
He could take the representative offered him or none at all,-a parallel
of Hobson's choice.
"Moreover, the order violates the 'majority rule' provided by Sec.
9(a). The intention of this section is that a majority of those voting
should select their representatives. If a majority should indicate by
their ballots that they did not desire to be represented by the U. W.
0. C. [the union which had received the largest number of votes in the
original election] nothing has been accomplished. No selection of
representatives has been made and collective bargaining falls, notwithstanding that in the first election 2,238 out of 2,806 voters indicated
their desire for collective bargaining. The purpose of the election was
to select, not to reject, representatives." ' 9
Since this decision was reversed by the Supreme Court,40 on the ground
that the Board's order of the run-off election was not appealable to the Circuit Court, Judge Hicks' remarks may be thought to lack authority. Certainly they lack logic, for these reasons: First,his reference to "the nominee
of the Board" overlooked the fact that the Board did not "nominate," but
merely advanced into the final round the union which had been given the
most votes by the voters. Judge Hicks would apparently have approved
the Board's "nomination" of both unions and its passing over of the "nounion" choice. Secondly, Judge Hicks was in error in thinking that some
union must be chosen, to satisfy the Act, since-and here is a third mistakeevery vote for a union was a vote for collective bargaining.
Judge Hicks' criticism was sound, however, to the extent that it emphasized
the fact that, in a Coos Bay type of run-off, the Board chose the union which
was to remain in the running without knowing what a majority of the voters
would wish. This determination, usually crucial, had to be based either on'
guesses of what the workers would have wanted if they had been consulted,
or on Chairman Madden's rather rigid concept of policy which insisted on
retaining "neither" under any and all circumstances. Agreeing that the
Board is free to pursue its investigation by progressively narrowing the
field of possibilities and then putting the question of the ballot again, the
question is: how should the field be narrowed? All three of the Board members, as well as Judge Hicks, recognized accurately that the Board's decision
of what spaces should go on a run-off ballot can have decisive effects.
391d.
at 600.
40
National Labor Relations Board v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
308 U. S. 413, 60 Sup. Ct. 306 (1940).
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Assuming, for argument, that none of the voters changes his mind in a
run-off, its results will fall somewhere between two extremes.
At one extreme will be this result: those voters who originally voted for
the two choices which reappear upon the run-off ballot will vote again as
they did before; and those who originally voted for the choice which is
dropped from the run-off ballot, being unwilling to express any second
choice, will abstain from voting. The invitation to register a second choice
is not accepted. At this extreme it is obvious that the Board's choice of the
squares for the run-off ballot has entirely decided the election. The plurality
of the ballots cast in the original election has become an apparent majority,
simply by cutting down the size of the vote. The Board could have reached
the result as effectively, without the formality of a run-off. The only advantage is that the Board can now point to the formal existence of a majority
for one choice, of all the ballots which have been cast, in compliance with
what is erroneously assumed to be a requirement of the statute. But the
whole effect, on these assumptions, is done with mirrors and the "majority"
obtained is both fictitious and factitious.
At the other extreme will be this result: those who originally voted for
the two choices which reappear still vote as they did before; but those who
voted for the eliminated choice all troop to the polls and cast their "secondchoice" ballots. The Board's decision has now determined whose "secondchoices" shall count. These "second-choices" may then affect the outcome,
but they will do so only upon conditions which are somewhat artificial.
These conditions are that the second-choice votes split unevenly between the
two reappearing choices and, further, that this unevenness is in the opposite
direction from the original voters' unevenness, and of sufficient magnitude to
more than counterbalance it. Why should the second-choices of one group
of voters be arbitrarily selected to be counter, while the second-choices of
the others remain impotent? Here it is only slightly less obvious that the
Board's decision of the make-up of the run-off ballot has had a substantive
effect upon the outcome of the election, and has quite probably decided it.
By the Rule of 194341 it was silently stated, in substance, that if the votes
of a plurality should be for "no-union," it must be conclusively presumed that
the others, who voted for one union or the other, would prefer "no-union"
if they could not get the one they wanted; but that if the vote for "no-union"
were second largest, or less, then it must be presumed conclusively that interunion rivalries were not so bitter, and accordingly that a vote for any union
41See note 9 supra for the text.
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was a vote for collective bargaining. Such presumptions invite critical thought.
Where the effect is to make the meaning of one voter's vote depend upon
the number of votes cast by a different group for a different choice, the
justice of the rule is difficult to swallow. Logic, and the analogy of political
run-off elections, would have suggested eliminating all but the two highest
choices. But even that would not remove the crucial question of interpretation from the realm of guesswork.I
All of these attempted solutions disenfranchise that voter who would
prefer no union if his own is not to be selected. Except in the case where
"na-union" has received the plurality, he simply cannot register that choice,
either by voting or by abstaining, either at the original election or at the
run-off. And in view of the large powers given to the statutory union, over
the working lives of all the workers in the unit, it is undemocratic and contrary to the policies of the Act to impose such a representative on a worker
who has never had an opportunity to vote against it.
The Board asserts, quite recently, that it gave careful consideration to the
plight of this disenfranchised voter before it adopted the Rule of 1943.43
But since the only result of that consideration was the Rule of 1943, which
does not remedy the evil, it is to be expected that the present members of the
Board will be willing to consider this question once again, especially since
it involves to some extent rights of unorganized voters objecting to any
union (with whom our disenfranchised voter might join if he could vote)
who are least able effectively to insist upon fair play for themselves. Employers should not try to represent them, for their motives would be reasonably suspect if they did. Therefore the Board alone can do the job.
Mr. Justice Jackson expressed an awareness of the need of according the
protections of democracy to the unorganized worker, in his dissenting opinion
in National Labor Relations Board v. A. J. Tower Mfg. C0.4 4 A consent
election had been held pursuant to an agreement between the company and
a union, in accordance with the Board's Rules. Challenge of one crucial
pro-union vote was made too late, under those rules, and the majority of the
Court upheld the election. Mr. Justice Jackson noted that "a third and, as
usual, a forgotten interest" was involved: the workers "who did not want
42

See notes 32 and 39 supra.

431n the Matter of Scripto Mfg. Co., 67 N. L. R. B. 1078, 1079 (1946); In the

Matter of John Oster Mfg. Co., 61 N. L. R. B. 1622-, 1623 (1945).
44329 U. S. 324, 335-338, 67 Sup. Ct. 324, 330-331 (1946). See also note 35 supra.
The disenfranchisement of the anti-union voter has the effect of furnishing real ammunition to the anti-union writer. The views of such a recognized friend of labor as
Judge Madden furnish material for the castigation of the Board's run off procedures in
such a book as ISElRAN, INDUS~tRIAL PEACE AND THE WAGNER ACT (1947) 24, 29, 80.
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to be represented by the union." That group cannot bring their problems
to the Board or to a court. Inquiry is cut off, unless the company makes
a timely objection on these workers' behalf. Half the employees "are forced
to accept union representation as the result of an election in which they were
not allowed to protect the ballot, and those who were, failed to do so."
The arbitrary element, which disefifranchises voters and decides elections
by fiat, is not necessary. A second-choice ballot would eliminate it, and
would also sweep away the whole institution of the run-off with its expense,
its wasted effort and its delay. The ballot in the original election need only
contain a second set of spaces for the recording of a second-choice, with, for
example, a heading like this:
"Vote below for your Second Choice.
Place a cross in the square representing your second choice. This will
be counted only if no choice receives a majority (more than half) of all
first-choice votes cast. The vote below, to be valid, must be cast for a
different choice from your first-choice vote."
Two objections have been urged against the use of a second-choice ballot.
First,that it would be illegal. Second, that it would be unworkable.
Since the courts now recognize that the Act does not require any firstchoice majority, or any majority at all, of those eligible, the objection to
legality can hardly be maintained. The objection here must be that certification based in part on second-choices cannot comply with the statute. But in
a run-off the "majority" obtained may be entirely illusory, a result not of
increasing the percentage obtained by the choice but of cutting down the
number who vote. The ratio of those who vote for the certified union to
all the workers in the unit may be the same in the run-off as in the original
election. And such change as there is results in general from the expression
of second-qhoices. Yet the legality of certification based on a run-off is
unquestioned. If the statute were read as setting any requirement of a
majority of votes cast, therefore, the established legality of run-off elections
would show that this requirement could be satisfied by a mere "lip service,"
by a simple reduction in the number of voters so as to transform the plurality
of yesterday into the majority of today, though consisting of the same voters
who voted before. It is submitted that such a reading, demonstrably farcical, would not be adopted by the courts, and that a broad and unrestricted
grant of power to use elections in any sensible way was what the Act
conferred.
If this is sound, the Board is legally free to utilize second-choices, as evi-
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dence, in deciding the ultimate issue which it is commanded to decide, viz.,
whether a majority of the workers in the unit probably (in view of the
possibilities available) want any union, and if so, which.
The objection of impracticability is not more impressive. Proportional
representation, which is much more complicated than a simple second-choice
ballot, has worked adequately in political elections. *The notion that poorly
educated workers might become confused and be unable to express a proper
second choice is unrealistic. An ordinary five-year-old child can understand
a second choiceL-something he would like if he cannot have what he wants
most. The American worker, even the backward and poorly educated one,
is amply competent to express a second choice intelligently. (There would
doubtless be some exceptional units in which great illiteracy, or special
difficulties of language, would make the second-choice ballot unwise. In
such cases continuance of present methods would always be within the Board's
discretion.)
The procedure would be as follows:
The First Step
Tabulate all first-choices. If any union has a majority, that union would
be eligible for certification., Whether it should then be certified, might depend
on other considerations, such as its character and democratic processes ;45
but in any event the election would have told all it could and would be at an
end. If "no-union" received a majority, similarly, the petition would of
course be dismissed.
If no choice has a majority, two further steps are needed, in conjunction,
to decide the question: which union the workers want, if they want any. The
second step alone can give no final result, but must be used as a preliminary
to the third step, which answers the question.
The Second Step
Assume that with such a ballot, the first-choice, votes, in a number represented by a, have been cast for Union A; in the number b, for Union B;
and in the number n for "Neither." (If a or b were more than half the valid
first-choice votes cast, Union A or B would, as noted, usually be certified,
and if n were more than half, the petition would be dismissed.)
But since there is no such majority, the second step will be to ascertain
which of the two Unions A or B, is the favorite. Add to a those of the n
45

Tenth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, (1946) 16-18.
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ballots for "Neither" which designate Union A as second-choice. These
may be referred to, for convenience, as the "(n 2 )a" votes. Add similarly to
b the (%) b votes for Union B as a second choice. Now if a + (n2) a is greater
than b + (n2)b, Union A is the union favored by the majority of the voters
in. a choice bet-ween the two unions only; whereas if b + (%)b is greater
than a + (%) a, Union B is favored on suh a choice.
Assume now that a + (%) a has turned out to be greater than b + (It2) b.
In that case all the a votes are now seen to be votes for collective bargaining.
The voter of an a vote has said: "I want collective bargaining if. I can be
represented by Union A." This condition is necessarily fulfilled, because a
majority of the voters have said: "We want Union A if we are to have any
union, rather than Union B."
The i. votes are of course votes against collective bargaining.
The second step, thus completed, is similar to a LeBlond run-off in that
it gives expression to the second-choices of those who voted their firstchoices for "no-union". But it differs from a LeBlond run-off in that it
purports to decide no more than the "problem of interpretation" as it relates
to the votes cast for one union or for the other. It simply determines-and
determines accurately-that some of the votes for a union really were votes
for collective bargaining (as all such votes have so often been surmised to be).
The votes for the union which is not the favorite still remain in doubt in this
respect. This doubt is then resolved by
The Third Step
The second-choices of those who voted b votes must now be examined.
The (b 2 ) a votes are to be added to a and the (b 2) n votes are added to n. If
a + (b2 )a is greater than n + (b 2 )in, Union A would be certified; but if
a + (b 2)a is less than nt + (b 2 )n the petition would be dismissed. The'
(b 2 ) a votes said: "If I cannot elect Union B then I want Union A"; while the
(b 2)n votes said: "If I cannot elect Union B I don't want any." The condition in each case is fulfilled because Union B cannot be elected against
the majority of first-choices and second-choices for Union A.46
46
The writers are indebted for the genesis of this proposal to Rum-offs in the N. L.
R. B. Elections, (1939) 8 INT. Juip. Ass'x BULL. (No. 3) 25, 26. This excellent
treatment of the subject proposes a second-choice ballot. The decision whether any
union is to be certified, however, would be made differently under that proposal. In
the terminology of the discussion in the text above the a votes would first be added
to the (b 2 ) a votes, and the b votes would be added to the (a2 ) b votes. If either
a + (b2 )a or b + (a 2 )b were a majority of the number of ballots cast,'.the issue of
collective bargaining, or none, would be deemed to be affirmatively settled, and the
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A couple of examples may help, by illustration, to make it clearer how these
processes would work in practice:

Example 1: B Union Elected
a
40

1st Choice

(a 2 ) b
2nd Choice

(It

b
32
(a 2 ) it
12

21

is assumed that 10%

(b 2 ) a
8

i
28
(b 2 )
23

(n2) a
6

100
(it 2 ) b
20

90

of the voters have failed to vote any second

choice.)
First step: There is no majority.
Second step: b + (n 2)b is greater than a + (n2)a.
32 + 20 equals 52; 40 + 6 equals 46.
Hence Union B is the favorite as between the two unions.
Third step: b + ,(a )b is greater than n +

32 + 21 equals 53; 28 +

(a 2 )n.
12 equals 40.

Hence Union B wins the election.
Example 2: Petition Dismissed

a

1st Choice
2nd Choice

b

40
(a 2 )b
12

32
(a 2 )t
22

(b 2 )a
8

28
(b 2 ),lt
23

100

(n 2 )a

(%2 ) b

18

7

90

union to be certified would then be determined by adding the (%L
2)a votes to the a votes
and the (n 2 ) b votes to the b votes, the greater sum to indicate the winner. It is submitted that this fails to consider the fact that a + (b2)a may be greater than a majority,
and yet, assuming b + (n2)b is greater than a + (i 2 )a, still a + (a 2 ) a may be
greater than a majority. To illustrate with actual figures:
Total
1st Choice
2nd Choice

(a 2 ) b
13

a

b

it

35

32

33

(a 2 ) i
19

(b2) a
21

(b 2 ),
7

(n 2 ) a
6

100
(z 2 ) b
24

90

(It is assumed that 10% of the voters have failed to vote any second choice.)
The INT. JURID. Ass'N BULL. method would certify Union B on these figures because
a + (b 2 )a gives a majority of 56 and the i second-choices are therefore to be distributed. b + (n 2 )b equals 56 which carries the election over a + (n 2 )a, 41. The
result is wrong, it is submitted, because the 33 whose first choice was no-union, atrd the
19 voters whose votes said: "We want Union A but if we can't have it we don't want
any" aggregate 52 votes, a majority, and should have resulted in a dismissal of the
petition.
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(It is assumed that 10% of the voters have failed to vote any second
choice.)
First step: There is no majority.
Second step: a + (n 2 )a is greater than b + (iz2)b.
40 + 18 equals 58; 32 + 7 equals 39.
Hence Union A is the favorite as between the two unions.
Third step: i + (b 2 )n is greater than a + (b 2 )a.
28 + 23 equals 51; 40 + 8 equals 48.
Hence the petition should be dismissed.
No system of this sort would be desirable, even if it were correct in theory,
if it could not be simply explained to the voters, in terms appealing to their
sense of fairness. This system can be so explained. For example, it could be
stated that:
"If either Union gets more than half of the 1st-choice votes, it will win.
"If 'Neither' gets more than half of the lst-choice votes, neither Union
will win.
"If there is no such majority, the 2nd-choice votes of those voting
'Neither' will be added to the other votes for the unions, to see which
Union leads.
"That Union will win the election, unless those whose 1st-choice was
against it voted 'Neither' (2nd-choice or lst-choice) on more than half
of all the ballots cast, in which event, neither Union will win the election."
If even this seems too complicated, the Board might advise the workers
simply that "If no first-choice choice wins, second-choices will then be considered." This might suffice. Indeed, it should when it is remembered that
the union leaders, whose business it is to understand and expound the minutiae of such things would have available the text of any new regulation which
the Board might adopt to put the proposal into effect. Such a regulation
47
in fact could hardly be more complicated than the present Regulations.
And in fact the complications would not .be as formidable as they might
seem at first blush. The principles are simple. The tabulations and calculations, with the aid of modem business machines, would be quick and easy to
make. It would certainly be much easier and cheaper than conducting
another full-scale election.
There might be more dismissals than under the present Rules. But if so,
it would be because of the giving of accurate effect to a policy of the Act.
Chairman Madden's solicitude to avoid imposing compulsory representation
by a union, on workers who have had no chance, to vote against it, should
47

See note 9 supra.
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not be dismissed lightly, in spite of the fact that he carried its application too
far.
A tie between first choices would normally be broken by the counting of
the second-choices. If the sums of first- and second-choices are tied, the sum
containing the larger first-choice might properly be held to prevail. In the
unusual case of a tie of first-choices combined with a tie of second-choices,
which could hardly occur in any election-of size, an actual run-off might be
ordered, to break the tie. But this would be so rare as not to cut seriously
into the advantages of the proposal. It is the large elections which consume
money, time and effort, and just in those the mathematical chances of such a
tie would be the least.
The method could be used with three or more unions, as well as with two,
except that with more than two choices upon the ballot, a majority might
not be obtainable by the final step of the calculation. The Board might either
certify (or dismiss) on a substantial plurality, or experiment with multiplechoice ballots. These, if workable, would of course give the most accurate
results. 48
4
SElections involving more than two unions are unusual but by no means unknown.
In such an election the "Second Step" can be taken with the same accuracy as for an
election involving two unions. The "First Step" cannot. Its objective, to determine
which is the favorite choice as among unions, is blocked by the fact that there are
no longer two alternatives, to which all votes can be distributed, but three or more
possibilities.
In an election among three unions there would be four 6hoices; and each ballot
might contain three boxes. (The fourth box would be immaterial, just as a third
box would be immaterial in an election between two unions, for the obvious reason that
it would be equivalent to an abstention.)
The "First Step" would be begun by counting all ballots as though the votes for
"None" did not exist :-i.e., an (i2) a. (n,3) b ballot or an (a2)n (a3)b ballot would
be grouped with the (a2)b ballots, etc. The result would be'tallies of first (union)
choices and second (union) choices, for each of three unions. If one union had a
majority of all the first (union) choices this "First Step" would be finished, because
the favorite union would be thereby determined. If not, several ways of proceeding
would be open: (1) The second (union) choices of those voters whose first (union)
choices were for the lowest of the three unions might be distributed among and added
to the first (union) votes cast for the other'two. (This would correspond to the technique used in a political run-off.) If four or more unions were involved, this might
have to' be done more than once. A majority would eventually be obtained. (2) The
plurality of first (union) choices might be treated as determinative. (This would
raise a question of the legality of a certification based on a plurality. But if the "Second
Step" has subsequently shown more workers wanting the plurality-union than "None",
the legal question should hardly be more serious, in theory, than in the case of a
certification after a Coos-Bay run-off.) (3) Second (union) choices could be added
to the first (union) choices. This suffers from two objections: First, that no majority needs result, and if none does result, this method would be as vulnerable as the
second method mentioned above. Second, it might seem unfair to the leading union
that the second choices of those who had given their first choices to it should count as
heavily as those first choices. But in view of the element of relativity inherent in

1947]

THE "RUN-OFF" ELECTION

The saving of time, one of the most vital considerations in the settlement
of a labor dispute, would be a consideration of prime importance iin favor of
the proposal. Labor disputes differ from most disputes in that the contestants have'to live together and work together. A prompt settlement which
is wrong is often better for all parties than a sounder settlement made after
a delay of months. This article advocates a prompt settlement which is
right, as against a delayed settlement, as at present, which is likely to be
wrong.
In seasonal industries delay is particularly disastrous, as will be seen by
noting the difficulties which the Board encountered in the salmon-fishing
business, as recorded in it the Matter of Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc. 9
There a new election, between all competing unions, had to be ordered
because the holding of a true run-off in the second season would have been
unfair, on account of the extensive shifting of workers which had occurred
between seasons. If the Board should wish to experiment with second-choice
ballots, seasonal industries might be a desirable point at which to start.
But speed of decision is a crying need in almost any industry.
For the reasons which have been stated we believe that the National Labor
Relations Board has authority to utilize second-choice ballots if its members
should agree that this would best effectuate the policies of the Act. But if
other amendments to the Act were being considered by Congress, for other
reasons, there would be some advantage in a declaratory addition to § 9(c)
which might read:
"In taking such a secret ballot in any case in which two or more unions
are involved the Board may utilize any method, including second-choice
or multiple-choice ballots, which will effectuate the policies of this Act."
any choice, it would not be entirely arbitrary, where no union has a majority of first
choices, to turn to the second choices and bring them in as of equal weight. (Any
weighting of first choices as against second choices would probably be too arbitrary to
be desirable.)
The "Second Step" would be taken by opposing the ballots on which the favorite
union (as determined by the "First Step") appeared ahead of "None" on the one hand,
to 49the ballots on which "None" appeared ahead of the favorite union on the other.
In the Matter of Alaska Salmon Industry, Inc., 64 N. L. R. B. 339 (1945).
ADDENDUM
In Case 8-R-2497 announced May 26, 1947 Chairman Herzog (concurring because
of the Board's rules) says that on the merits he doubts the assumption that a majority
for two unions means a majority for collective bargaining, and he prefers the political
method of run-off between the two highest choices. The Taft-Hartley Law enacts this
method. (Title I, § 101, amending the Wagner Act at § 9(c) (3)).

